| 碳中和目标下京津冀区域协同碳减排演化博弈 |
| 摘要点击 834 全文点击 111 投稿时间：2024-10-15 修订日期：2024-12-03 |
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| 中文关键词 协同 跨区域 碳减排 演化博弈 京津冀 |
| 英文关键词 collaboration cross-regional carbon emission reduction evolutionary game Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 碳减排的跨区域协同合作是实现碳中和目标的有效机制. 基于演化博弈理论，构建京津冀区域协同碳减排演化博弈模型，分别分析北京-天津、北京-河北和天津-河北的协同碳减排策略选择的演化过程. 结果表明：①协同减排成本是影响京津冀参与协同碳减排的重要因素，成本过大，会导致协同碳减排关系的破裂. ②惩罚对维系协同碳减排关系具有一定调节作用，增加违背协同的机会成本，有利于双方脱离“囚徒困境”，维系协同碳减排关系，尤其是北京-天津区域间. ③协同减排收益的提高，有利于提高北京-河北和天津-河北的协同碳减排积极性，保障协同关系的稳定性. ④减排率的提升会伴随着协同减排倦性的产生，应当予以关注，尤其是天津和河北区域间. 最后提出针对性的建议措施以促进京津冀协同合作碳减排，为京津冀协同治理提供理论依据和决策支持. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Cross regional cooperation on carbon emission reduction is an effective mechanism to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. This paper， based on evolutionary game theory， constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative carbon emission reduction in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei urban agglomeration， analyzing the evolution process of collaborative carbon emission reduction strategy selection between Beijing-Tianjin， Beijing-Hebei， and Tianjin-Hebei. The research results follow： ① The cost of collaborative carbon emission reduction is an important factor affecting the participation of Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei in collaborative carbon emission reduction， and excessive cost can lead to the rupture of the collaborative carbon emission reduction relationship. ② Punishment has a certain moderating effect on maintaining a collaborative carbon emission reduction relationship. Increasing the opportunity cost of violating synergy helps both sides get out of the “prisoner's dilemma” and maintain the cooperative carbon emission reduction relationship， which is especially the case between Beijing and Tianjin. ③ The increase in the benefits of collaborative emission reduction is conducive to enhancing enthusiasm for collaborative carbon emission reduction in Beijing-Hebei and Tianjin-Hebei， ensuring the stability of the collaborative relationship. ④ The increase in emission reduction rate will be accompanied by the emergence of collaborative emission reduction fatigue， which should be given attention， especially between Tianjin and Hebei. Finally， targeted suggestions and measures are proposed to promote carbon emission reduction through collaborative cooperation between Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei， providing a theoretical basis and decision-making support for collaborative governance between Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei. |
